I conduct an on-line experiment to decompose giving in a dictator game into amounts motivated by pure altruism and amounts motivated by the warm glow of giving as defined in Andreoni (1989) . By manipulating the price of benefit to the recipient while holding the price of the act of giving constant, I estimate separate values for giving motivated by warm glow and giving motivated by pure altruism,. I find significant evidence of both pure altruism and warm glow as motivations for the amounts sent to an anonymous recipient. However, I also find a large gender difference in the motivation for giving. Females are significantly less sensitive to the price of benefit to the recipient than are males, suggesting females are motivated relatively more by warm glow and relatively less by pure altruism, while men display the opposite behavior.
Introduction
In this paper, I use experimental data from a dictator game conducted over the internet to decompose giving into its altruistic and egoistic components in a within subject design, thus allowing a measurement of the warm glow effect (Andreoni 1989) . I find giving motivated by warm glow and giving motivated by pure altruism across demographic groups based on selfreported responses to an exit survey, which allows a comparison of motivations in giving based on age, gender, and income.
In economic experiments, subjects routinely choose not to maximize their payoffs. In prisoners' dilemmas, subjects frequently cooperate (Doebeli and Hauert 2005) . In public goods games, subjects often contribute (Zelmer 2003) . The simplest example of this behavior is seen in the dictator game. In the dictator game, one subject is given an amount of money and then allowed to send any portion of that amount to another subject. The Nash equilibrium is to send nothing. While it is true that many subjects do keep all the money, many do not. A significant fraction of subjects sends positive amounts (Engel 2011) . Traditional, neo-classical economic theory presents man as a rational, maximizing agent, motivated solely by material rewards to self. This interpretation of human action does model economic behavior well in many circumstances. However, in addition to failing to account for a wide variety of results in economic experiments, it does not explain large portions of economic activity seen in the real world.
Addressing this gap in our understanding, Andreoni (1989) developed an impure altruism model of giving that included two distinct patterns of other-regarding behavior. The paper proposed that giving could be motivated by pure altruism where the giver derives utility from the benefit the gift provides to the recipient, and by pure egoism where the giver derives utility from the act of giving itself independent of its impact on the recipient; calling this latter effect warm glow. A mixture of warm glow and pure altruism as motivation is characterized as impure altruism. That paper also proposed an index of pure altruism such that:
Where is the amount given by person i that is motivated by pure altruism and is the amount given by person i that is motivated by warm glow (Ibid., p.1452) .
Several prior studies have tested for the existence of warm glow and pure altruism as motivations for giving (Ribar and Wilhelm 2002) , (Gangadharan, Grossman, and Jones 2014) , but few have attempted to quantify the effect and to the author's knowledge none have done so by demographic group. Research addressing warm glow frequently takes the perspective of giving in a public goods context. An example of this is Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) which uses a public goods game with variable private values. They find evidence of a small warm glow effect, but no significant evidence of pure altruism. By contrast and also in the context of a public goods game, Goeree, Holt, and Laury (2002) find statistically significant evidence of altruism but reject warm glow as a causal factor in subject behavior. Crumpler and Grossman (2008) use a simple and innovative design, also used in (Luccasen and Grossman 2017) , where subjects can give to a charity, but with a perfect crowding out effect. Any amount given by the subject reduced by an equal amount a donation given to the charity by the experimenter.
Knowing that their contributions would not alter the amount received by the charity, 57% of subjects still made a positive contribution. Across all subjects, contributions averaged 20% of their endowments which is strong evidence of warm glow as a motivation. Lilley and Slonim (2014) examined warm glow giving in a study of the volunteering puzzle, where people donate time to charities even when donating the wage equivalent sum of money is more efficient. They find evidence of a mixture of pure altruism and warm glow as motivating factors in charitable contribution and estimate between 15.5% and 21% of amounts donated were motivated by warm glow. In a study of choice between volunteering time or donating money, Brown, Meer, and Williams (2013) find that subjects prefer to donate time rather than money even when it is the less efficient choice. They argue that the cause is a preference for the warm glow of volunteering. Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2014) decompose charitable giving by motivation and find significant evidence of both war glow and pure altruism. Konow (2010) find that charitable giving cannot be explained by warm glow alone and is more consistent with subjects following context specific economic norms. Karlan and List (2005) use a natural field experiment of charitable giving and find that providing matching funds increases amount donated, but higher match rates from $1:$1 to $3:$1 do not significantly increase donations further. Eckel and Grossman (2003) find framing an additional amount as a match rather than as a mathematically equivalent rebate increases amounts given. Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010) find a demographic difference in giving motivation with warm glow being a significant factor for women but not for men, and for neither gender do they find evidence of pure altruism. In this paper, I extend the literature by measuring differences in the relative influence of warm glow and pure altruism as motivations for giving across demographic groups of age, income, and gender.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical model of giving. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 reviews results. Section 5 is discussion, and section 6 concludes.
Model
I differentiate between giving motivated by benefit to the recipient and giving motivated by benefit to the giver by varying their relative prices. If I observe dictators sending the same amount of money regardless of how much I as experimenter multiply it, then I can conclude that they are motivated by the constant price of the act of giving and not by the varying price of benefit to the recipient.
Assume a dictator has an endowment and utility function = ( , , ) where
is the portion of retained, ∈ [ | = − ] is the amount sent to another subject , and given multiplication factor μ, ∈ [ | = ] is the amount received by subject . Also assume = 1. The choice of may be motivated by the welfare of the recipient entering directly into the utility function of the dictator ; utility from the act of giving unrelated to the welfare of the recipient ; or a mixture of the two motives, balanced against the amount retained . Now, assume that for an amount sent by the same dictator, an anonymous recipient will receive = where > 1. If the dictator is motivated by and , then the dictator will reallocate towards and away from compared to the prior case where = 1.
However, if the dictator receives utility from but not from then no reallocation will occur.
By observing the extent to which subjects vary as a function of μ , I can infer the relative contributions to utility from both and , and estimate values for Andreoni's α which is the ratio of giving due to pure altruism to total giving.
I implement this analysis by asking subjects how much of an initial endowment they would chose to send to an anonymous, passive counterpart given that the amount chosen will be multiplied by the experimentor. Each subject is presented with a variety of values for the multiplier ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. At μ = 0.2 the counterpart receives 20% of the amount sent, up to μ = 5.0 where the counterpart receives 500% of the amount sent, with one choice randomly selected for payment. Using a continuous range from 0.2 to 5.0 was considered (List, Sadoff, and Wagner 2011) , but was not chosen in order to reduce subjects computaional burdon.
Given that the amounts subjects choose to send are censored from below by zero and from above by the $1 endowment, OLS estimates of the conditional mean would be biased (Rigobon and Stoker 2009). To avoid this bias, I use quantile regression of the conditional median. I chose this option because it is robust to censoring (Portnoy 2016 ) and non-parametric, thus avioding the both the sensitivity to heteroskedasticity found in Tobit estimation (Arabmazar and Schmidt 1982) and the necessesity of assumptions about the data generating process 1 .
For each subject's set of choices of amounts to send, I perform the regression shown in equation 2, where is the amount retained and μ is the value of the multiplier. The initial endowment is $1.00, so 1 − is the amount sent by dictator i.
The estimate of the amount sent that does not vary as a function of the multiplication factor is the constant ̂0 . This is the portion of 1 − that was motivated by factors unrelated to the benefit of the recipient and so is the isolated influence of warm glow. ̂1 is the estimate of the amount sent that was motivated by the variable benefit of the recipient, and therefore is the isolated influence of pure altruism. And so, ̂0 +̂1 is the estimate of the total amount sent prompted by both motivations. Substituting these values into equation 1 gives equation 3
This calculation raises two issues. First, since subjects are presented with a range of values for μ, if they are motivated by pure altruism to any extent (i.e. ̂1 ≠ 0) then ̂ will not be constant across μ. Therefore, to facilitate comparisons with other studies that may not include a multiplier, I base all estimates of α on a value of = 1 A second issue is how to code ̂ when both ̂0 and ̂1 equal zero. Since this is the case when a dictator always sends nothing regardless of value of μ, I define (̂0 =̂1 = 0) ⇒ (̂= 0) on the basis that since nothing was given, pure altruism could not be a motivation for giving. It should be noted that in the case where a subject always gives nothing, the absence of pure altruism does not imply the existence of warm glow. 
Experiment Design

Treatments
The experiment is structured as a dictator game with a variable multiplication factor which increases or decreases the amount received by a randomly paired passive counterpart for a given amount sent. Dictators receive an initial endowment of $1.00 and are instructed that they may send any portion of the endowment to a randomly selected subject in another group. They are then presented with a list of multiplication factors ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and are asked to choose the amount they would send for each value of μ. They are told that after making their choices, one choice will be randomly selected to be exectuted. Multiplication factors are presented on a single page, with the order randomly set as high to low or low to high.
Instructions as seen by subjects are included in appendix A 2 .
Prior to starting the experiment, prospective subjects are asked to answer this question: "You have a basket containing five apples. You eat one apple and sell two apples. How many apples are now in your basket?" This question serves to prevent automated scripts from entering the experiment, similar in function to CAPTCHA 3 codes seen on websites where automated spam is a concern. Subjects are not allowed to enter the experiment without entering the correct answer. Next, subjects are shown instructions followed by a pair of questions to test understanding 4 . After answering the understanding question, subjects are shown the correct answer with an explanation of why it is correct. Unlike the automated script filter question, subjects are allowed to proceed to the main body of the experiment regardless of whether they answered the understanding question correctly or incorrectly. After entering the amounts they would send to a randomly paired subject in a second group for each value of μ, subjects are presented with an exit questionnaire which collects basic demographic data. They are also invited to add an unstructured message about any technical difficulty encountered in the experiment or anything else they wish to share. They are then shown their payoff and the experiment concludes. For reasons discussed in the next section, subjects in the recipient group are recruited in a separate asynchronous session.
Infrastructure
The design described in the previous section was conducted over the internet using two main technologies.
oTree
oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016 ) is a software platform that allows multiplayer decision experiments to be conducted over the internet. oTree experiments are coded in Python and use the Django web framework. 5 Experiment development is done locally then uploaded to a remote web server along with the oTree supporting files. I used the commercial web hosting company Heroku 6 for hosting services. After server deployment, experiments are run through a web-based administrative interface. Since the experiment runs on a remote web server, subjects can enter the experiment from any location. Participation is not limited to any particular operating system or device form factor. All that is required is a browser with internet access.
Python, the language used to code oTree experiments, is a popular general purpose computer language which is well suited and commonly used for web development. prospective users of oTree should be aware that as of this writing it is still under development and so should be considered a work in progress.
Mechanical Turk
Subject recruitment and payment was done through the Mechanical Turk microemployment website. Mechanical Turk is an Amazon service which allows workers to perform small tasks for modest compensation. In Mechanical Turk terminology, a task is a Human
Intelligence Task Interaction between dictators and recipients are done asynchronously. All dictators make their choices of how much to send, then at a later time a second group of Mechanical Turk workers is recruited as passive recipients. Participants in the dictator group are ineligible to participate in the recipient group. Since the information flow is only from dictator to recipient, the small time delay this method imposes between money sent and money received should not bias dictator choices. This method was chosen due to a peculiarity of Mechanical Turk. After posting a HIT, workers will see and accept the HIT with a variable delay of between a few seconds and a few minutes, depending on the number of workers searching for HITs at the time.
If after accepting the HIT workers were paired with another worker, then whichever worker was the first of the pair to arrive would be unable to proceed into the experiment until the next worker accepted the HIT and completed the pair. If the rate of arrival exceeds a few seconds, workers with higher levels of impatience may preferentially return the HIT or otherwise exit believing that the wait may be excessive or that the HIT is malfunctioning. This could initiate a cascade of workers being unable to be paired in a reasonable amount of time causing the experiment to fail.
Experiments have been run successfully on Mechanical Turk using real-time interaction between group members (Mayo, McCabe, and Kreuger 2016) , but this issue must be taken into consideration in experiment design.
Sample and randomization
No personally identifying information is passed from worker to requester other than a unique Mechanical Turk worker identification number. Amazon securely stores workers' personal information including financial information required to process payments. This simplifies experimenter record keeping and ensures subject privacy, but also raises the possibility of workers attempting to participate in the experiment repeatedly. Through the oTree API, a worker qualification can be set. This tells Mechanical Turk that the requester only wants the HIT to be accessible by workers who meet certain criteria. The two criteria used in this experiment were that the worker must reside in the United States and not have previously participated in the experiment. Amazon verifies workers' country of residence by requiring payments to workers claiming United States residence be deposited electronically to a United
States bank account. The association between bank account and worker ID number also restricts the ability of one worker holding more than one Mechanical Turk worker account. Amazon also uses proprietary methods of fraud control not publicly disclosed.
Workers are not able to access any information about the content of the experiment prior to accepting the HIT assignment, other than IRB risk disclosure and a description of the HIT as an academic experiment in decision making. Therefore there is little reason to suspect significant bias in results caused by self selection into the experiment. The on-line environment does, however, raise methodological questions about the external validity of experiments conducted without substantial control of subjects' environments (Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011) . In addition, stakes in on-line experiments using Mechanical Turk can be an order of magnitude lower than the same experiment would require if conducted in an in-person laboratory setting. Amir, Rand, and Gal (2012) studied both of these issues by replicating a series of classic economic experiments in an on-line environment and found no significant difference between the behavior of on-line and in-person subjects. Fortuitously, the stakes studied in the on-line treatments were the same as used in this experiment, $1.00.
Another issue of potential concern is the demographic composition of the subject pool and how it may differ from the demographics of subjects available for in-person experimentation in ways that might call into question the generalizability of results. Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz (2012) examined the demographics of Mechanical Turk workers who participated in experiments and found the distribution to be closer to that of the United States population than is found in subjects reported in a group of in-person studies published in major political science journals.
Results
Summary statistics
The experiment was run over four consecutive weekdays. 146 Mechanical Turk workers accepted the HIT and 112 8 completed the experiment giving a dropout rate of 23%. This dropout rate is quite high when compared to the typical in-person laboratory experiment, but is actually good for on-line experiments. Dropout rates of over 50% are not uncommon in on-line experiments (Dandurand, Shultz, and Onishi 2008) . This is understandable given the lack of social sanction for exiting an experiment prematurely by simply closing a browser window.
The sample has a mean age of 34 and has reasonable gender balance at 59% male and 41% female. Mean income is $53,600 per year. Summary statistics are shown in 
Motivation for giving
Quantile regression of amounts sent on multiplication factor for each dictator in the full sample produced within subject estimates of the coefficient on the variable μ representing the effect of changing the price of benefit to the recipient in the dictator's choice of amount to send, and a constant term representing the choice of amount to send that was not a non-constant function of the price. These values estimate the amounts sent motivated by warm glow (constant term) and pure altruism (coefficient on μ). A one-sample t-test showed the regression constant terms to be greater than zero, (Mean = 0.230, SE = 0.027, t(111) = 8.373, p = 0.000) . A second one-sample t-test showed the coefficients on μ to also be greater than zero, (Mean = 0.020, SE = 0.007, t(111) = 2.764, p = 0.007) . Detailed test results are shown in appendix B. Since both the coefficient on the multiplier and the constant terms are significantly greater than zero at the 0.01 confidence level, the nulls of hypotheses 1a and 1b can be safely rejected. This confirms the existence of both pure altruism and warm glow in the full sample. The fraction of total giving motivated by pure altruism (Andreoni's α) in the full sample was slightly over one-third, (Mean = 0.379, SD = 0.730) . The distribution of α is shown in figure 1 .
Kernel density plot of α for full sample.
Kernel is Gaussian, bandwidth = 0.2.
Motivation by age
Pearson's r showed giving motivated by warm glow was slightly declining with the age of the dictator, but the effect was not statistically significant. (r = -0.0047, n = 112, p = 0.961) .
Similarly, giving motivated by pure altruism was slightly increasing with the age of the dictator and was also not statistically significant. (r = 0.0012, n = 112, p = 0.990) . Since age is not a significant predictor of either amounts sent due to warm glow or amounts sent due to pure altruism, the nulls of hypotheses 3a and 3b are not rejected. A test of α also showed no significant correlation with age, (r = 0.001, n = 112, p = 0.995) . Warm glow, pure altruism, and α as functions of age are shown in figures 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Warm glow as a function of age. α as a function of age.
Motivation by income
Pearson's r showed a small positive correlation between warm glow and income that was not statistically significant, (r = 0.037, n = 112, p = 0.697) . Pure altruism was also positively correlated with income and not statistically significant, (r = 0.017, n = 112, p = 0.857) . Finally, α was slightly, but not significantly, increasing in income, (r = 0.034, n = 112, p = 0.719) .
Warm glow, pure altruism, and α as functions of income are shown in figures 5, 6, and 7. Amounts sent as a function of the multiplier μ for men and for women.
Discussion
The results reported in the previous section confirm that both warm glow and pure altruism are motivating factors in subjects' decisions to give to an an anonymous, paired subject.
These results confirms the existence of both warm glow and pure altruism that has been found in several prior studies. Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) found evidence of warm glow, but not of pure altruism as a motivation for giving in a public goods game. By contrast, Goeree, Holt, and Laury (2002) found evidence of pure altruism, but not of warm glow as motivating factors in subjects' behavior. And Crumpler and Grossman (2008) found strong evidence of warm glow as a mativator, but did not test for the existence of pure altruism. Beyond establishing the existence of both effects, by multiplying mean amounts sent by mean α for each gender, I find that warm glow is responsible for the majority of giving (61%) with pure altruism composing a minority share (39%). This contradicts the findings of Lilley and Slonim (2014) which quantified the relative influence of the two motivators and found that that larger share of giving was due to pure altruism (79%) with only 21% resulting from warm glow. By contrast, Eckel and Grossman (1996) found that men were largely insensitive to changes in the price of punishment.
Examining results by demographic group shows no significant relationship between motivation and either the age or income of the dictator. Although, both giving due to pure altruism and warm glow were slightly increasing in income which is unsurprising since total giving also increased slightly with income. Other than showing that both motivators exist, the major result is the difference in motivation by gender. Although males and females were equally generous when the multiplier effect was absent (μ = 1.0) with males giving $0.31 and females giving $0.33, their behavior diverged significantly at other multiplier levels. At the lowest multiplier value where only 20% of the amount sent reached the recipient, females still gave $0.28, while males by contrast reduced their giving to $0.20. At the highest multiplier value, where the recipient received 500% of the amount sent, females sent almost exactly the same amoun $0.29. Males responded to the highest multiplier by increasing their amounts sent to $0.34. This implies that females are motivated almost entirely by warm glow, while men are significantly motivated by both warm glow and pure altruism. This gender difference is broadly consistent with the findings of Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010) which found warm glow to be a significant factor for women but not for men, although for neither gender do they find evidence of pure altruism. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) also find that males are much more responsive to the price of benefit to the recipient, while females tend to send the same amount regardless of price. By contrast,
Alternative explanations and possible objections
The decomposition of motives into warm glow and pure altruism depends on the assumption that warm glow giving is unrelated to the amount received by the passive subject. It is possible that this is not true. If, for example, a dictator derived utility from the amount received by the passive player but had no concern for the welfare of that player, then the dictator could be highly responsive to price and simultaneously motivated only by warm glow. If so, then values generated by this model for giving motivated by warm glow would be a lower bound and values for α would be an upper bound. Although this is possible, it would require a substantial revision of the impure altruism model that is beyond the scope of this paper. It is also possible that a person giving a fixed percentage of their endowment regardless of the amount received by an anonymous counterpart may be motivated by concern for the recipient, but effecting that goal through a tithing rule, as was seen in Eckel and Grossman (2004) .
The major results in terms of demographic differences could be artifacts of some form of self selection by workers prior to accepting the HIT or afterwards within the 20% who began the study but did not complete it. Selection prior to accepting the HIT is unlikely because the advertisement language was deliberatly vague about the nature of the experiment, but absence of evidence is not evidence of absence so the possibility cannot be ruled out.
Conclusion
This paper reports the results of an on-line experiment designed to disaggregate giving in a dictator game into the portion motivated by pure altruism and the portion motivated by warm glow, as described in Andreoni (1989) . By manipulating the price of benefit to the recipient while holding the price of the act of giving constant, I am able to estimate values for a coefficient of altruism α (Ibid. p1452). I find significant evidence of both pure altruism and warm glow as motivations for giving. In addition, I repeat the statistical estimation on sub-sets of the sample based on demographic criteria as reported in an exit survey. The fraction of amounts sent to an anonymous recipient that are motivated by warm glow is uncorrelated with the age of the dictator and is increasing in dictator's income, but the relationship is not statistically significant.
An analysis by gender shows that male subjects responded strongly to price suggesting they are mostly motivated by pure altruism, while female subjects were almost completely insensitive to price suggesting a large fraction of giving motivated by warm glow and little motivated by pure altruism. . ttest pure_altruism, by(female) unequal --------+------------------------------------------------------------------- . 0350345  ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- diff | .0337141 .0144572 .0050412
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